Teleology

A teleology is any philosophical account which holds that final causes exist in nature, meaning that design and purpose analogous to that found in human actions are inherent also in the rest of nature. The word comes from the Greek τέλος, telos; root: τελε-, "end, purpose" (not to be confused with τῆλε, “at a distance, far from”). The adjective "teleological" has a broader usage, for example in discussions where particular ethical theories or types of computer programs are sometimes described as teleological because they involve aiming at goals.

Teleology was explored by Plato and Aristotle, by Saint Anselm around 1000 AD, and later by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgment. It was fundamental to the speculative philosophy of Hegel.

A thing, process or action is teleological when it is for the sake of an end, i.e., a telos or final cause. In general it may be said that there are two types of final causes, which may be called intrinsic finality and extrinsic finality.[1]

• A thing or action has an extrinsic finality when it is for the sake of something external to itself. In a way, people exhibit extrinsic finality when they seek the happiness of a child. If the external thing had not existed that action would not display finality.
• A thing or action has an intrinsic finality when it is for none other than its own sake. For example, one might try to be happy simply for the sake of being happy, and not for the sake of anything outside of that.

In modern science teleological explanations tend to be deliberately avoided since the Novum Organum of Francis Bacon, because whether they are true or false is argued to be beyond the ability of human perception and understanding to judge.[2] Some disciplines, in particular within evolutionary biology, are still prone to use language that appears teleological when they describe natural tendencies towards certain end conditions; but these arguments can almost always be rephrased in non-teleological forms.

Classical teleology

Platonic

In the Phaedo, Plato argues that true explanations for any given physical phenomenon must be teleological. He bemoans those who fail to distinguish between a thing's necessary and sufficient causes, which he identifies respectively as material and final causes (Phaedo 98-9):

Imagine not being able to distinguish the real cause, from that without which the cause would not be able to act, as a cause. It is what the majority appear to do, like people groping in the dark; they call it a cause, thus giving it a name that does not belong to it. That is why one man surrounds the earth with a vortex to make the heavens keep it in place, another makes the air support it like a wide lid. As for their capacity of being in the best place they could be at this very time, this they do not look for, nor do they believe it to have any divine force, but they believe that they will some time discover a stronger and more immortal Atlas to hold everything together more, and they do not believe that the truly good and 'binding' binds and holds them together.
— Plato, Phaedo 99

Plato here argues that, e.g., the materials that compose a body are necessary conditions for its moving or acting in a certain way, but that these materials cannot be the sufficient condition for its moving or acting as it does. For example (given in Phaedo 98), if Socrates is sitting in an Athenian prison, the elasticity of his tendons is what allows him to be sitting, and so a physical description of his tendons can be listed as necessary conditions or auxiliary causes of his act of sitting (Phaedo 99b; Timaeus 46c9-d4, 69e6). However, these are only necessary conditions of Socrates' sitting. To give a physical description of Socrates' body is to say that Socrates is sitting, but it does not give us any idea why it came to be that he was sitting in the first place. To say why he was sitting and not not sitting, we have to explain what it is about his sitting that is good, for all things brought about (i.e., all products of actions) are brought about because the actor saw some good in them. Thus, to give an explanation of something is to determine what about it is good. Its goodness is its actual cause - its purpose, telos or "reason for which" (Timaeus 27d8-29a).

Aristotelian

Similarly, Aristotle argued that Democritus was wrong to attempt to reduce all things to mere necessity, because doing so neglects the aim, order, and "final cause," which brings about these necessary conditions:

Democritus, however, neglecting the final cause, reduces to necessity all the operations of nature. Now they are necessary, it is true, but yet they are for a final cause and for the sake of what is best in each case. Thus nothing prevents the teeth from being formed and being shed in this way; but it is not on account of these causes but on account of the end....
— Aristotle, Generation of Animals V.8, 789a8-b15

In the Physics Aristotle rejected Plato's assumption that the universe was created by an intelligent designer using eternal forms as his model. For Aristotle, natural ends are produced by "natures" (principles of change internal to living things), and natures, Aristotle argued, do not deliberate:

"It is absurd to suppose that ends are not present [in nature] because we do not see an agent deliberating."
— Aristotle, Physics 2.8, 199b27-9;[3] see also Physics 2.5-6 where "natures" are contrasted with intelligence[4]

These Platonic and Aristotelian arguments ran counter to those presented earlier by Democritus and later by Lucretius, both of whom were supporters of what is now often called metaphysical naturalism, or accidentalism:

Nothing in the body is made in order that we may use it. What happens to exist is the cause of its use.
— Lucretius, De Rerum Natura (On the Nature of Things), IV, 833; cf. 822-56.

Modern and postmodern philosophy

In the various neo-Hegelian schools - proposing a history of our species some consider to be at variance with Darwin, as well as with the dialectical materialism of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and with what is now called analytic philosophy — the point of departure is not so much formal logic and scientific fact but 'identity'. (In Hegel's terminology: 'objective spirit'.)

Individual human consciousness, in the process of reaching for autonomy and freedom, has no choice but to deal with an obvious reality: the collective identities (such as the multiplicity of world views, ethnic, cultural and national identities) that divide the human race and set (and always have set) different groups in violent conflict with each other. Hegel conceived of the 'totality' of mutually antagonistic world-views and life-forms in history as being 'goal-driven', that is, oriented towards an end-point in history. The 'objective contradiction' of 'subject' and 'object' would eventually 'sublate' into a form of life that leaves violent conflict behind. This goal-oriented, 'teleological' notion of the 'historical process as a whole' is present in a variety of 20th century authors, although its prominence declined drastically after the Second World War.

In contrast teleology and "grand narratives" are eschewed in the postmodern attitude[5] and teleology may be viewed as reductive, exclusionary and harmful to those whose stories are erased.[6]

Against this, Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that a narrative understanding of oneself, of one's capacity as an independent reasoner, one's dependence on others and on the social practices and traditions in which one participates, all tend towards an ultimate good of liberation. Social practices may themselves be understood as teleologically oriented to internal goods, for example practices of philosophical and scientific enquiry are teleologically ordered to the elaboration of a true understanding of their objects. MacIntyre's book After Virtue famously dismissed the naturalistic teleology of Aristotle's 'metaphysical biology', but he has cautiously moved from that book's account of a sociological teleology toward an exploration of what remains valid in a more traditional teleological naturalism.

Teleology and ethics

Teleology informs the study of ethics.

Businessmen commonly think in terms of purposeful action as in, for example, management by objectives. Teleological analysis of business ethics leads to consideration of the full range of stakeholders in any business decision, including the management, the staff, the customers, the shareholders, the country, humanity and the environment.[7]

Medical ethics

Teleology provides a moral basis for the professional ethics of medicine, as doctors are generally concerned with outcomes and must therefore know the telos of a given treatment paradigm.[8]

Consequentialism

The broad spectrum of consequentialist ethics, of which utilitarianism is likely the most well-known, focuses on the end result or consequences, with such maxims as Utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill's "the greatest good for the greatest number", or the maximum utility. Hence they are teleological in nature. This is in contrast with deontological ethics, such as Immanuel Kant's the Categorical Imperative, in which an end result or consequences are less important, or even irrevelant, but the action itself, the means or will, is the focus.

Teleology and science

In modern science, an explanation that relies on teleology is avoided, because whether they are true or false is argued to be beyond the ability of human perception and understanding to judge.[2] But using teleology as an explanation style, in particular within evolutionary biology, is still controversial.[9]

Biology

Apparent teleology is a recurring issue in evolutionary biology,[10][page needed] much to the consternation of some writers.[9]

Statements which imply that nature has goals, for example where a species is said to do something "in order to" achieve survival, appear teleological, and therefore invalid. Usually, it is possible to rewrite such sentences to avoid the apparent teleology. Some biology courses have incorporated exercises requiring students to rephrase such sentences so that they do not read teleologically. Nevertheless, biologists still frequently write in a way which can be read as implying teleology even if that is not the intention. These issues have recently been discussed by John Reiss.[11][page needed] He argues that evolutionary biology can be purged of such teleology by rejecting the analogy of natural selection as a watchmaker; arguments against this analogy have been promoted by writers such as Richard Dawkins.[12]

Some authors, like James Lennox, were more skeptical, and have argued that Darwin was a teleologist,[13] while others like Michael Ghiselin described this as a myth promoted by misinterpretations of his discussions and emphasized the distinction between using teleological metaphors and being teleological.[14]

Biologist philosopher Francisco Ayala has argued that all statements about processes can be trivially translated into teleological statements, and vice versa, but that teleological statements are more explanatory and cannot be disposed of.[15] Karen Neander has argued that the modern concept of biological 'function' is dependent upon selection. So, for example, it is not possible to say that anything that simply winks into existence without going through a process of selection has functions. We decide whether an appendage has a function by analysing the process of selection that led to it. Therefore, any talk of functions must be posterior to natural selection and function cannot be defined in the manner advocated by Reiss and Dawkins.[16] Ernst Mayr states that "adaptedness... is a posteriori result rather than an a priori goal-seeking."[17] Various commentators view the teleological phrases used in modern evolutionary biology as a type of shorthand. For example, S. H. P. Madrell writes that "the proper but cumbersome way of describing change by evolutionary adaptation [may be] substituted by shorter overtly teleological statements" for the sake of saving space, but that this "should not be taken to imply that evolution proceeds by anything other than from mutations arising by chance, with those that impart an advantage being retained by natural selection."[18]

Cybernetics and teleonomy

Julian Bigelow, Arturo Rosenblueth, and Norbert Wiener have conceived of feedback mechanisms as lending a teleology to machinery. Wiener, a mathematician, coined the term 'cybernetics' to denote the study of "teleological mechanisms."[19] Cybernetics is the study of the communication and control of regulatory feedback both in living beings and machines, and in combinations of the two. In the cybernetic classification presented in "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology", teleology is feedback controlled purpose. [20][21] This classification system was criticized and the need for an external observability to the purposeful behavior was established to validate the behavior and goal-attainment. The purpose of observing and observed systems is respectively distinguished by the system's subjective autonomy and objective control.[22]

In recent years, end-driven teleology has become contrasted with "apparent" teleology, i.e. teleonomy or process-driven systems.

References

1. "The received intellectual tradition has it that, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, revolutionary philosophers began to curtail and reject the teleology of the medieval and scholastic Aristotelians, abandoning final causes in favor of a purely mechanistic model of the Universe." Ransom Johnson, Monte, Aristotle on Teleology, Oxford University Press pages 23-24.
2. Aristotle. The Organon and Other Works. Opensource collection. Translated under the editorship of W.D. Ross. Full text at Internet Archive (archive.org). p. 649 in text. n647 in page field. Retrieved 2009-10-22.
3. Aristotle. The Organon and Other Works. pp. 640–644 in text. n639–643 in page field. Retrieved 2009-10-22.
4. Jean-François Lyotard (1979).
5. Lochhead, Judy (2000). Postmodern Music/Postmodern Thought, p. 6. (ISBN 0-8153-3820-1)
6. Leonard J. Brooks, Paul Dunn (2009-03-31). "Business & Professional Ethics for Directors, Executives & Accountants". Cengage Learning: 149. ISBN 9780324594553. Unknown parameter |unused_data= ignored (help)
7. Jeremy Sugarman, Daniel P. Sulmasy (2001). Methods in medical ethics. Georgetown University Press. p. 78. ISBN 9780878408733.
8. Hanke, David (2004). "Teleology: The explanation that bedevils biology". In John Cornwell. Explanations: Styles of explanation in science. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 143–155. ISBN 0-19-860778-4. Retrieved 18 July 2010.
9. Ruse, M., & Travis, J. (Eds.) (2009). Evolution: The First Four Billion Years. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press
10. Reiss, John O. (2009) Not by Design: Retiring Darwin's Watchmaker. Berkeley, California: University of California Press
11. Dawkins, Richard (1987) The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evidence of Evolution Reveals a Universe Without Design. New York: W W Norton & Company
12. Lennox, James G. (1993). "Darwin was a Teleologist" Biology and Philosophy, 8, 409-21.
13. Ghiselin, Michael T. (1994). "Darwin's language may seem teleological, but his thinking is another matter". Biology and Philosophy. 9 (4): 489–492. doi:10.1007/BF00850377.
14. Ayala, Francisco (1998). "Teleological explanations in evolutionary biology." Nature's purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology. The MIT Press.
15. Neander, Karen (1998). "Functions as Selected Effects: The Conceptual Analyst's Defense," in C. Allen, M. Bekoff & G. Lauder (Eds.), Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology (pp. 313-333). Cambridge, MA; London, UK: The MIT Press.
16. Mayr, Ernst W. (1992). "The idea of teleology" Journal of the History of Ideas, 53, 117–135.
17. Madrell SHP (1998) Why are there no insects in the open sea? The Journal of Experimental Biology 201:2461–2464.
18. Cybernetics, or control and communication in the animal and machine' (1948)
19. Rosenblueth, Arturo (Jan.,1943). "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology". Philosophy of Science. 10 (1): 21. JSTOR 184878. Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (help); Check date values in: |date= (help)
20. Conway, Patrick (1974). Development of volitional competence. MSS Information Corp. p. 60. ISBN 0842204245.
21. George, Frank Honywill (1943). Purposive behavior and teleological explanations. Gordon and Breach. pp. xII. Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (help)